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This paper examines how state and non-state actors govern through pursuing speculative 
conservation among resource dependent people who must renegotiate altered livelihoods amidst 
extractivism in ruptured landscapes.  As donor aid declines and changes form, bilaterals, state 
agencies and civil society now pursue advocacy in overlapping spaces of intensifying 
extractivism and speculative governance in the ruptured frontiers of Southeast Asia.  In these 
overlapping spaces, bilaterals and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) struggle to work 
with upland farmers who negotiate the contrasting expectations of the abstract, speculative 
nature of conservation initiatives and the lucrative nature of extractive labour in the face of 
dramatic transformations of the social and material basis of agrarian livelihoods and 
landscapes.   Through a case study of the Philippine uplands we demonstrate that as speculative 
conservation unfolds and manifests within and beyond these landscapes, it endeavors to revalue 
nature monetarily in ways that help reorganize labour and capital in an effort to overcome the 
exhaustion of capital wrought by rupture. We propose that speculative conservation during 








After decades of championing indigenous rights, empowerment and sustainability, state 
and non-state actors must now engage new conjunctures of global governance and deepening 
commodity production intersecting and conflicting in Southeast Asia’s frontiers. In particular, 
state agencies and NGOs engage with, and broker on behalf of, the rural poor who increasingly 
negotiate the overlapping worlds of intangible forms of speculative governance via conservation 
(e.g., payment for ecosystem services and similar instruments) and the more tangible draw of 
extractivism (labour in oil palm plantations, mining etc.) in landscapes rupturing around them.  
In the process, the livelihoods and landscapes of poor, resource dependent peoples have become 
subject to dramatic transformations that arise through the cumulative stresses of deepening 
capital flows, intensifying markets, and resource accumulation – coalescing in a process of 
‘rupture’ (Tsing, 2015; Moore, 2015, Lund, 2016). Both speculative conservation and 
extractivism are implicated in such ruptures.  Indeed, the massive socio-material changes that 
drive and emerge from rupture can accelerate governance flows, conservation interventions, and 
enclosures that reinforce authority and control over ‘value-added’ resources in the making 
(Margulis et al., 2013).  Here both conservation and industrial practices work together to 
reinforce accumulation and control over land, labour and capital (Kelly, 2011). As speculative 
conservation and extractive expansion converge, landscapes are apportioned, revalued and 
remade into capital’s own image, whether for (abstract) natural capital accounting (Sullivan 
2013) and or (tangible) oil palm expansion (Moore, 2015).  Rupture is thus constitutive of the 
social and material geographies of capital in these spaces, which are remade as conservation and 
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extractive worlds collide (Gordillo, 2014).  It is in these spaces that marginal uplanders must 
renegotiate life and livelihood.     
  
This paper explores the impacts and outcomes of speculative conservation and 
extractivism intersecting with upland livelihoods and landscapes in the context of rupture. We 
examine how in the last decade state, bilaterals and civil society have shifted governance gears to 
promote the ostensive virtues and benefits of speculative interventions based on the perceived 
financial value of ‘future nature’—a growing trend in global conservation generally, where 
selling perceived benefits and success go hand-in-hand with capitalizing on the anticipated value 
of nature and any associated financing that is stoked by ‘crisis’ (West, 2009; Igoe et al., 2010; 
Büscher, 2014; Büscher and Fletcher 2015).  In this shift, bilateral, state and NGO practices—
our primary focus—have partly shifted from an earlier developmental agenda (Dressler et al., 
2010) where ‘community-based’ interventions often drew on existing resources and value chains, 
to more speculative governance promises based on the economic potential of conserving a 
‘parceled nature’ (Fairhead et al., 2012), where the generative (but often uncertain) potential of 
natural assets (or ‘natural capital’) is constructed, elevated and conveyed through discourses of 
success.  In this context, stocks of natural capital are rendered legible, valuated, and somehow to 
be tapped to finance and support local livelihoods and afforestation programs (without 
necessarily knowing when and from where equivalent funds will flow) (Büscher et al., 2014).  
The potential of such governance to harness nature’s capital as ‘added value’ is thus framed in 
terms of future-oriented promises and benefits among uplanders whose livelihood needs are 
rather real and immediate.  
 
	 4
We then examine how such governance overlaps with emerging extractive development 
in the context of ruptured landscapes—in the process changing local social relations of 
production and exchange so significantly that older ways of life and livelihood are reworked and 
remade (Gordillo 2014).  Social relations and valuation of land and labour, for example, may 
transform with heightened expectations of profit and material benefits only to be subsequently 
subsumed with fears of debt and uncertainty.   As rupture unfolds, it is rural smallholders who 
must negotiate the varied risks, uncertainties and opportunities that emerge as conservation and 
extraction co-constitute rural landscapes.  We explore how state and non-state actors try to 
govern in this context by pursuing speculative, intangible interventions among resource 
dependent smallholders who are being subsumed by extractivism in significantly altered 
landscapes.   
 
In so doing, we offer a conceptual and empirical proposition: as speculative governance 
unfolds institutionally and manifests across scale, its main ideas and practices may create value 
from ‘ruined nature’ through the financing of ideas and practices that aim to overcome or 
regenerate the very exhaustion wrought by rupture itself (see Büscher, 2014).  In other words, the 
value speculative conservation seeks to generate represents a spatial-temporal ‘fix’ for capital 
over-accumulation situated at the conjuncture of conservation and extractivism (Harvey 2006). 
Coupled with moments of rupture, speculative conservation works to monetize ‘natural capital’ 
as a ‘discursive commodity’ (Vel, 2015) that is forged through conservation narratives wherein 
its core concepts and technical practices are framed as inherently successful–a form of glossy 
boosterism–that promotes and extends its legitimacy and potential to create more financial value.   
As the notion of natural capital is promoted and sold as a successful concept or policy 
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intervention, its value mounts as it circulates within and through the social networks of the 
mainstream conservation bureaucracy, particularly big international NGOs, through which it 
gains recognition, legitimacy and more financing (see Büscher, 2014 for ‘value in motion’), 
irrespective of the reality that the ‘natural capital’ pursued remains largely immaterial – 
particularly for local ‘stakeholders’ whom it is primarily intended to benefit.  The discursive 
valuation of natural capital therefore intensifies when new technologies and ideas circulate in an 
ostensive bid to save ecosystem services that are immanently threatened due to rupture. Moments 
of crisis and rupture thus create opportunities for the (re)production of financial value, wherein 
governance actors and processes circulate ideas and finance across the countryside to reinvest in 
labour and capital to contend with transformed rural landscapes (e.g., through associations, 
livelihood support programs, etc). As such, speculative conservation holds the potential to 
function as frontier capitalism’s latest ‘spatial fix’ in its promise to create additional value by 
reorganizing, expanding and connecting ideas, capital and labour to new markets and financing 
opportunities in important landscapes subject to rupture (Harvey, 2001, 23).  We explore how 
indigenous farmers negotiate livelihood realities and expectations at the nexus of these powerful 
conjunctures in the Philippine uplands.  
  
Our paper contributes to a nascent body of literature in critical agrarian studies that 
examines how new governance regimes overlap and conflict with extractive industries with 
varied impacts and outcomes (see Peluso and Lund 2011; Corbera et al., 2017; Hunsberger et al., 
2017).   As we do, this critical literature points to how governance draws value from ruptured 
agrarian landscapes as well as from centres of rule well beyond frontier spaces. A recent special 
issue highlights, for example, how often the state’s withdrawal from providing social and 
	 6
environmental safeguards, effectively transfers degrees of sovereign control over land, resources 
and people to the private sector, civil society and donors (Corbera et al., 2017; Uson, 2017). 
Several cases show that as state agencies and financial institutions facilitate investment 
opportunities and cede degrees of authority and responsibility in managing land and people, 
spaces open up for private capital to govern land and labour by way of extracting cheaply and 
profiting highly—inducing a crisis of capitalist reproduction.  In this process, the reordering of 
indigenous institutions and rights to land facilitates deepening capital flows that push people and 
landscapes to points of rupture, effectively inducing a crisis of over-accumulation and collapse.  
In these ruptured spaces, then, speculative conservation emerges in direct response to these crisis 
tendencies to reset or fix by reforming to capital’s abstract value (Ekers and Prudham, 2017)  
 
Rather than accepting the ‘exhaustion of capitalism’s Cheap Nature strategy’ (Moore, 
2015), the actors, ideas, technologies of speculative conservation reform capital to draw out its 
abstract value from well beyond sites of accumulation and rupture, by stoking the finance 
attached to ‘big ideas’ such as natural capital accounting (NCA) valuation, various funding 
flows, and even corporate subsidies. Uson (2017), for example, shows for the central Visayas, 
Philippines, that the rupture created by typhoon Haiyon in 2013 and associated humanitarian 
interventions created a complex spatial fix wherein climate change policies and discourses 
changed the direction of land rights struggles to open the door for private sector control and 
profit accumulation (see also Work and Thuon, 2017).  Indeed, it is no coincidence that big 
international NGOs and bi/ multilateral governance schemes increasingly intersect with and draw 
value from over-exploited, ruptured spaces in the pursuit of their own ‘value objectives’ (see 
Büscher and Davidov, 2014).   
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The core logic of how speculative conservation sustains itself therefore partly reflects 
surplus capital that is constantly looking for productive investment (Ekers and Prudham, 2017), 
but that remains abstract and intractable to local resource users and seldom ever materializes in 
tangible benefits. We argue, indeed, that the prospect of conserving ‘natural capital’ can only 
ever be speculative and abstract because: it is defined and valued precisely in this way; and its 
putative physical basis is subject to extensive rupture compromising the ‘natural capital’ 
ostensibly being conserved and valued. We show that while speculative conservation, 
particularly NCA, misaligns with livelihoods and landscapes being remade through extractive 
rupture, it manifests as a spatial fix by creating value out of ruined spaces themselves. 
 
We focus on the frontier island of Palawan where two major governance interventions – 
REDD+ and Phil-WAVES – are manifesting in upland and coastal landscapes ruptured by 
flanking oil palm plantations and mine sites. Palawan is an ideal setting for such a study. Long 
considered undeveloped, unsettled and bountiful, the island was once considered a safety valve 
for political and economic challenges in other parts of the Philippines (Eder and Fernandez, 
1996). Recently, intensifying battles concerning over-development and conservation involving 
social movements, NGOs and major extractive corporations have emerged on the island once 
again (Eder and Evangelista, 2015).  Rather than provide an empirical analysis of how farmers 
rework livelihoods at moments of rupture and speculative conservation, we aim to contrast the 
objective of conserving natural capital with the harsh realities of (actually doing so in) fractured 
landscapes increasingly devoid of ‘ecosystem services’ amongst indigenous farmers who 
contend with precarious livelihoods (see Fletcher et al., 2016).  
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We focus on two localities where local agrarian landscapes have been transformed by oil palm 
and mining to the point where notions of conserving natural capital through transforming farmer 
labour become untenable.  
 
Methods 
 This paper draws on 40 in-depth interviews and participant observation at two 
communities (Biluan and Maracuan) located at the southeastern and western coast/interior of 
Palawan Island, respectively. Between 2012-2016, over four months, the first author carried out 
key informant interviews with: NGO representatives (6), Barangay officials (6), tribal leaders 
(3), leaders of palm oil cooperatives (5), swidden farmers/ palm oil laborers (20) and other 
activists involved in campaigns against extractive industries on Palawan.  Most interviews ran 
between 1-2 hours (some respondents were interviewed more than once). The sample was 
purposeful and involved referrals by knowledgeable others. Interviews were mostly in the town 
proper and lowland, coastal sitios (villages, just beyond ancestral lands).  Analysis focused on 
repeat responses within and between the interviews, with common themes drawn together as 
















Declining funds, speculative conservation and ruptured landscapes 
 
In Southeast Asia, the prospects of NGOs and other actors sustaining the environmental 
governance interventions introduced in earlier decades (1980-90s) recently changed for the 
worse.  As Southeast Asian countries began deregulating their economies, donor funding was 
slashed and, in some cases, national economies attained ‘lower middle-income status’ (Bello et 
al., 2004). Many NGOs thus faced declining domestic funds and scrambled for scarcer, 
competitive global funding (Malhotra, 2000).  
 
In the late 1990s, public-private partnerships emerged whereby funding was provided by 
the private sector and or new global governance initiatives that promoted market-oriented 
schemes.  In much of Southeast Asia, cash-strapped domestic (and wealthier international) 
NGOs increasingly made so-called market-based instruments (MBIs) central to their policies 
(Dressler and Roth, 2011).  In general, such market-based conservation aimed to assign monetary 
values to nature, which, in turn, could ostensibly be harnessed to finance program interventions.  
In practice, the interventions (e.g., PES and REDD+) usually included local incentive schemes 
and compensation for lost income-generating opportunities due to livelihood substitutions 
(Büscher et al., 2014).   
 
Regionally, global governance schemes and bilateral aid have now (though usually only 
rhetorically) established the role of MBIs as the most efficient and effective way to generate 
money by realizing the ‘true’ value of nature (Büscher et al., 2014). In tapping this value, 
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programs and projects ought to be self-financing and offer incentives that compel farmers to 
adopt more sustainable practices. In embracing market-based programs, NGOs have combined 
their conventional efforts and institutional practices (e.g., community-organizing etc) to garner 
rapport and trust among local residents with newer interventions (typically framed as ‘low 
carbon’ livelihoods) that offer incentives and varied market opportunities offering the promise of 
multiplier effects (usually associated with sedentary farming and or non-timber forest products).  
The framing of these interventions commonly features future-oriented promises with locally 
anticipated ‘positive returns’, but usually with delayed, hollow, or intangible outcomes (e.g., 
revenue from carbon trading once a new global market materializes) (Novellino and Dressler 
2010; Fletcher and Büscher, 2017).  Following Sullivan (2013), we call these interventions 
‘speculative conservation’.   
 
Speculative conservation in ruptured landscapes   
 
Increasingly, then, bilaterals, state agencies and NGOs in particular have become 
entangled with transnational governance dynamics driving speculative interventions that stoke 
local expectations of potential and hope – but hope pinned on abstract, intangible and future-
oriented promises that offer little, if anything, for present livelihood realities in ruptured 
landscapes.  The ideas that underscore speculative conservation interventions often already have 
positive and desirable attributes assigned to them well before implementation, which are invoked 
locally to inform expectations (Ahmed, 2010). Maintaining perceptions of success and associated 
expectations thus depends upon how policies and programs are produced within and through 
influential institutional and discursive networks that invest in, reproduce and circulate the 
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underlying truth claims (ibid). As Rap (2005) notes for water governance in Mexico, the 
‘preoccupation with the performance of success’ ensures that assertions of success becomes self-
referential and self-evident amongst those investing (politically and economically) in the reifying 
policy narrative (see also Mosse 2004; Büscher 2014). In reference to REDD+, Lund et al (2017) 
note that “policy models are therefore dependent upon narratives and metaphors that distill 
complex realities” into simplified narratives to legitimate expert ideas, practices and the 
continued flow of resources (p. 2).  In this way, natural capital accounting and similar such 
schemes are thus less about material natures than discursive strategies aiming to draw finance to 
maintain projects, even in the face of contradictory empirical data (Roe 1991, 1994; Sullivan, 
2013; Büscher, 2014). Consequently, the durability of speculative conservation only wanes 
amongst policy makers and practitioners when they no longer support the broader narrative 
within which its concepts and promises sit (cf. Mosse, 2004).   
   
  Among local farmers, however, project interventions can gradually set expectations and 
aspirations that produce ‘big hopes’ for outcomes that, given natural capital’s discursive nature 
and local conditions of rupture, often simply do not exist.  Yet the promise of interventions can 
stoke expectations and aspirations despite objectives not being fully understood nor ever 
eventuating. Even when understood, the time lag to achieving outcomes is often well beyond the 
daily, short-term and future planning of rural households who desire tangible improvements in 
the here and now. Inculcating a sense of hope amongst local smallholders through speculative 
interventions thus articulates with local senses of livelihood security and overall progress but 
typically bypasses the immediacy of farmer realities, needs and expectations. Little, however, is 
known about how such interventions might unfold in the context of farmers negotiating new 
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livelihoods realities in the debris of ruptured landscapes. How, for example, can natural capital 
accounting generate value from ecosystem services and offer farmers incentives to conserve 
lands after having lost agricultural plots, or having water contaminated from toxic mining 
operations nearby?  We take up these issues through our Palawan case study. 
 
Declining funds, speculative conservation and ruptured landscapes in the Philippines 
	 
    Scholars have pointed to a long history of social movements struggling for political 
change through protest that bypasses formal political processes (Clarke, 1998). While NGOs 
have often worked with state officials and retained weak ties with local communities, Ferdinand 
Marcos’ authoritarian dictatorship (1965-1986) had most NGOs forging grassroots movements 
that resisted elite control over the political system for personal and familial gain (Clarke, 1998; 
McCoy, 2002).  As Marcos quelled civic organization and political unrest, NGOs and People’s 
Organisations (POs) expanded through covert socio-political networks with other groups, 
forming diverse coalitions to resist state control and subordination (Constantino-David, 1998). 
NGO-driven social movements soon culminated in the ‘People’s Power’ revolution that ousted 
Marcos in 1986.  
 
Under the post-Marcos Aquino administration, new government policies opened up 
political spaces to accommodate the growth and participation of NGOs within Philippine society 
(Brillantes 1994; Mercer 2002). The changing sentiment and policies of development agencies 
towards ‘good-governance’ and ‘people-centered’ programs spurred NGO growth while 
directing their objectives and their networked relationships in the country (Brillantes 1994; 
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Putzel 1998). With the amended Philippine Constitution of 1987 supporting the involvement of 
civil society in governance and development, the legitimacy of NGOs as government partners in 
development grew significantly (Brillantes 1994). As a Constitutional extension, the Local 
Government Code of 1992 facilitated the decentralisation of political process and introduced 
provisions for the participation of NGOs and People’s Organizations, effectively formalizing 
civil-society partnerships (Eaton 2003).  Thus, Philippine NGOs brought “to the public agenda 
issues hereto ignored or repressed” (Silliman and Noble 1998a: 292). By 1999, the country 
hosted more than 60,000 NGOs compared to 27,100 in 1986 (Parks, 2008).  
  
In the late 1990s, however, a decline in NGO funding and esteem in various sectors saw 
civil society activities shift strategically.  Under the deepening oligarchic state of then-president 
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, the intensification of neoliberalism and sense of NGO over-funding 
saw ‘Leftist’ organizations being ‘hollowed out’ (Bello et al., 2004).  Indeed, after successive 
governments –from Ramos to Estrada– had already facilitated trade liberalization, Arroyo soon 
drove what Bello called an ‘all-sided free market transformation marked by rapid deregulation, 
privatization and trade and investment liberation’ (p. 12).  In turn, being declared a lower 
middle-income country soon prompted many major donors to leave the Philippines; donor aid 
thus declined significantly throughout the 1990s (Parks 2008).  In the early to mid-1990s, for 
example, aid commitments from major donor countries including Canada and the USA dropped 
from US $2.7 billion in 1990 to US $1.4 billion in 1996, with only limited funds taking the form 
of grants (Aldaba et al., 2000). Overseas Development Assistance grants decreased in particular 
from $296.5 million to only $165.9 million over the same period. This in itself was problematic 
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for domestic NGOs in the Philippines because ‘unofficial estimates of donor dependency … 
[suggested] that 50% to 95% of their annual budgets’ (ibid, p. 675) came from such grants.  
 
After 9/11, aid declined rapidly, forcing donors such as the Ford Foundation to leave the 
country and cut the core funding of more than 200 local NGOs (Parks, 2008).  There were few, if 
any, domestic donors to take the place of such funding organizations and bilateral aid.  Despite 
sustained national growth, domestic NGOs thus failed to find proportional levels of funding in 
the country (ibid).  Collectively, these pressures meant that NGOs soon tapped limited but 
increasingly prevalent sources of funding for market-based schemes in conservation and 
development (Novellino and Dressler, 2010)— a broader governance agenda “emerged under the 
mantra that assigning a monetary value to nature was the most efficient and effective way of 
saving it” (Roth and Dressler, 2012, p. 363). The idea was that by assigning an imputed dollar 
value (or price) to ‘scarce’, valuable natural resources (flora, fauna, ecosystem services etc), the 
‘real’ monetary value of these resources would be realised through various types of market 
exchanges (trading, offsetting etc) whereby actors, institutions, and or agencies pay for 
ecological services/ values being delivered, typically by both resource users and biophysical 
processes (ibid). The revenues realised from these transactions are asserted to efficiently finance 
conservation and farmers for lost livelihood opportunities, to support transitions to more 
sustainable resource uses, and to generate more revenue from existing resource uses to offset 
future exploitation (Büscher et al., 2014). These ideas and interventions, however, were typically 
rearticulated and highly speculative in terms of the objectives, incentives and outcomes that they 
hoped to produce locally.    
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Over time, grassroots NGOs have found themselves negotiating the rhetoric and practice 
of market-based governance in a so-called emerging ‘green economy’, drawing on governance 
programs from bilaterals advocating speculative conservation.  In particular, as part of the state’s 
‘climate smart’ investments, governance platforms such as the Wealth Accounting and the 
Valuation of Ecosystem Services’ (or ‘WAVES’) Payment for Ecosystem Services initiative and, 
relatedly, Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) emerged to 
facilitate climate change mitigation and adaptation locally by paying smallholder farmers to 
conserve ‘natural capital’ (e.g., forest carbon and hydrological functions) amidst expanding 
mining and biofuel production in rapidly transforming frontiers.   
 
Speculative conservation and rupture – the Palawan cases 
 
 The rise of transnational governance programs involved speculative, market-based 
conservation that aimed to add value to natural resources that local users would tap to overcome 
the opportunity costs of moving to ‘greener’ livelihoods.  In the case of Palawan, REDD+ and 
the Philippine WAVES program (Phil-Waves) was launched in this spirit as commodity 




In Palawan, a dynamic NGO consortium soon adopted REDD+ under the green economy 
banner.1  New partners included the regional NGO, the Non-timber Forest Products Exchange 
																																																								
1	Since the 2007 Bali Action plan (UNFCCC COP 2008), international bodies and states have championed REDD+ 
as an innovative and efficient way for wealthier countries to pay poorer ones to enlist rural farmers to conserve 
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Program (NTFP-EP), and the international NGOs, Fauna and Flora International and 
Conservation International, among other domestic groups.  
 
Needing a new funding base and policy instrument to curb the incursion of oil palm and 
secure lands for indigenous peoples, NGOs decided that adopting REDD+ might help them 
achieve this.  Working with academics, other NGOs and the state, the NGOs drafted and 
submitted two key documents: the Readiness Preparedness Plan (RRP) to the World Bank’s 
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and the Philippine National REDD Plus Strategy (PNRPS) in 
2009 to UN REDD (both approved in 2010-2011).  This outcome led to coordinated preplanning 
initiatives with the DENR, the Forest Management Bureau (FMB) and a consortium of REDD 
partners. The NGO consortium emerged as the grassroots initiative, CODE REDD, or 
Community Development through REDD+.  The Consortium saw REDD+ as a “potential 
funding scheme for forest conservation” and “to strengthen the voice of indigenous groups, 
forest-based communities and civil society in the Philippines […] in the REDD plus discourse 
and in the UNFCCC discussions” (CoDe REDD, 2011, website: http://ntfp.org/coderedd/about-code-
redd/objectives-and-strategies/).  
 
  On a practical level, the CODE REDD consortium aimed to establish a 50,000 ha 
REDD+ pilot project across select sites in the Victoria-Anepahan mountain range of southern 
Palawan (PNRPS, 2010)–an area overlapping with both mining and palm oil production (and in 
one area, an indigenous ancestral domain claim) in southwestern Palawan. As part of the 
																																																								
forest and carbon. Post-Paris (COP 21), it remains a fragmented global initiative to create a financial value for the 
carbon stored in forests, offering incentives to governments and farmers in developing countries to reduce emissions 
from forestlands and invest in low-carbon rural development pathways (see www.un-redd.org). 
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consortium, different NGOs had contrasting functions in executing the Readiness programme. 
The Palawan-based indigenous Federation, NATRIPAL, was charged with connecting farmers 
with so-called Forest Governance Bodies, establishing Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) and 
developing low carbon livelihood activities with the NGO, IDEAS (NTFP-EP, 2008). Moreover, 
it was hoped that indigenous Pala’wan and Tagbanua forest users might be sufficiently trained to 
be engaged in forest governance so as to draw on non-carbon forest and biodiversity ‘co-
benefits’ and, eventually ‘sustainable carbon financing’ schemes.     
 
NGOs thus intensified their governance initiatives during the REDD+ Readiness phase.  
While carbon financing and payments were still in the design stages, livelihood ‘co-benefits’ for 
sustainable farming were being rolled out with a focus on non-carbon benefits such as water 
supply systems, agroforestry enterprises and NTFP value-adding, as well as cash cropping (e.g., 
rubber, mango, and jack fruit)—all of which were geared toward low carbon futures, and 
eventually carbon-trading based revenue.  In one key implementation area, called Biluan and the 
Biluan (Tagbanua) ancestral domain claim, key consortium NGOs debriefed community 
participants about the loss of forest cover in the area, the essence of the carbon inventories, and 
the level of carbon stocks across key transects. In the process, NGO agents themselves noted that 
the ‘results may be too technical for the common folks to digest easily’.  As we show, these 
speculative governance promises held little meaning: flanking and overlapping the Biluan 
ancestral domain claim was a long-standing nickel mine and expanding oil palm plantation that 
had already incorporated most of those lands slated for REDD+ governance.  
 
Phil-WAVES - PES 
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Just as REDD+ came to fruition, in 2010, during the CBD meeting in Nagoya, Japan, the 
WAVES’ initiative (Wealth Accounting and the Valuation of Ecosystem Services) was launched. 
Overseen by the World Bank, the WAVES program was rolled out (with IMF and EU support) 
across several countries, including the Philippines, to introduce programs for natural capital 
accounting (NCA) in line with ‘internationally agreed standards… [and] other ecosystem service 
accounts’ (https://www.wavespartnership.org/en/about-us). The work plan for each country was slated to 
compile and scale up ‘accounts’ for natural resources such as forests, water and minerals in line 
with the UN’s System of Environmental-Economic Accounting (SEEA). Once uploaded, such 
national level accounting would be aligned with the global level assessment.  
 
In 2013, consultations for the Philippine component of this program, Phil-WAVES, were 
being carried out by national government agencies and NGOs in two areas that exemplified the 
‘status quo’ of rupture in the country (Fontanilla, 2014): the Laguna Lake Basin and Southern 
Palawan. In both areas, the objectives were to ‘promote sustainable development through wealth 
accounting, with natural capital as its major determinant’ (p. 1). In practice, this meant 
establishing ecosystem service accounting for two areas in Southern Palawan and to assist with 
an analysis of trade-offs associated with different resources and ecosystem use scenarios. 2015 
was a particularly busy year, with Technical Working Groups providing NCA workshops and 
training through database management, satellite analysis and geographic information systems 
design. To date, several key ecosystem service accounts have been completed, including land 
and CO2, with the changing plantation landscape and ‘intangible’ indigenous values of the 
landscapes proving difficult and sensitive to itemize and value.  
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Building on work of the NGO Conservation International, Phil-WAVES’ Palawan-based 
activities aimed to account for stocks of natural capital and their relative financial value in 
already ruptured landscapes.  In a recent ‘Pilot Ecosystem Account for Southern Palawan’ report 
(WAVES draft report, 2015), the assessment of ecosystem value in ‘stocks’ and relative 
monetary value was characterized as contending with localized issues such as erosion control of 
upland forests, water regulation by upland forests, and the contribution of ecosystems to paddy 
rice production, corn and palm oil production. The new WAVES initiatives sought to show that 
in the uplands, a tree left standing is worth more than a tree felled, despite upland forests already 
having being largely cleared for mining and oil palm around farmer homesteads.   
 
As we show, in the context of REDD + and Phil WAVES case areas—Biluan and 
Maracuan Interior in Southwestern and Southeastern Palawan, respectively—indigenous 
Tagbanua and Pala’wan perceptions and values regarding land and livelihoods had little to do 
with conserving natural capital. Instead, their livelihood struggles and aspirations contended with 
ancestral landscapes, former mosaics infused with cultural meanings, now being worked over by 
mining and oil palm development. Understanding the significance of the REDD+ and Phil-
WAVES breaking on southern Palawan is therefore best achieved by contrasting the promises of 
natural capital with the livelihood realities of indigenous uplanders residing in the same ruptured 
landscapes. 
  
Mining and Palm Oil Development on Ruptured Lands 
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As state, bilateral and NGO actors were in the process of implementing REDD+ and Phil-
Waves, mining and oil palm expansion continued unabated, with both adjacent to another in 
locally ruptured landscapes.  As each space overlapped with upland localities, varied 
consequences unfolded for local livelihoods and aspirations. 
 
With the passing of the Mining Act in 1995, the Philippine state opened the door to major 
foreign investment, ownership and expansion of mining in the country. Recent tariff 
liberalization (Executive Order 264) facilitated such investments and expedited the permitting of 
mining (Bello et al. 2004); in 2004, 350 mining applications were approved on Palawan alone 
(Rasch, 2013). Most mines overlapped with indigenous lands, destroying swidden plots and 
forests while drawing farmers out as wage laborers. In some quarters, this necessitated formal 
consultation concerning the co-benefits and compensation going to indigenous peoples 
negatively affected by mineral extraction, which tended to happen through the ‘formal’ process 
of Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC). With the ratifying of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act 
(IPRA) in 1997, indigenous peoples worked with certain NGOs and the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to establish (certificates of) ancestral domains as 
titled holdings (CADTs). In establishing these claims, peoples had to demonstrate indigeneity by 
way of cultural continuity and connectedness to land (i.e., occupancy and use over time). This 
meant that those indigenous communities with CADTs —or their state-reified Tribal Council— 
held formal tenure rights and claims over land and forest resources, necessitating that mining and 
other extractive industries engage in FPIC and potentially offer local financial compensation.  In 
Palawan, however, the paying out of benefits ultimately meant lubing elite indigenous brokers 
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and greasing the wheels of extraction. Since the 1990s, more and more mines have been 
encroaching and, in some cases, even overlapping with CADTs.  
  
Over time, oil palm development grew rapidly on Palawan, often flanking mining areas 
and overlapping with REDD+ and Phil-WAVES conservation territories. Since then-President 
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s signing of the Biofuel Act in 2006, as well as Medium-term 
Development Plans aiming to develop millions of hectares of high value cash crops, the 
penultimate President, Aquino Jr. continued to promote the financing of boom crop production in 
order to replicate production in Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand (Larson et al. 2014). In 2004, 
the Provincial Government created the Palawan Palm Oil Industry Development Council 
(PPOIDC) to promote the expansion of the industry. Thereafter, the Palawan Palm and 
Vegetable Oil Mills Inc (PPVOMI) and its sister company, Agumil Philippines Inc (AGPI), 
began palm oil development on the island.2 The first palm oil seedlings were planted in 2007 and 
then harvested in 2011; the initial 3,591 ha planted were to expand beyond 15, 469 ha (Larson et 
al, 2014)—including the sites of speculative conservation, Biluan and Maracuan, in southern 
Palawan.   
 
Located in the southern Municipality of Brooke’s Point, the PPVOMI controlled the land 
upon which oil palm milling takes place and had also established a tree nursery. AGPI facilitated 
access to land for cultivation through lease agreements and/or contact arrangements through out-
grower schemes.  While some farmers planting palm oil from AGPI were agrarian reform 
beneficiaries under Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (where the CLOA serves as 
																																																								
2 PPVOMI is 60% Singaporean and 40% Filipino-owned and AGPI is 75% Filipino and 25% Malaysian owned (Larson et al, 
2014). The Malaysian parent company is Agusan Plantations Inc.   
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collateral), contracts were also established between farming communities and the AGPI by 
setting up cooperatives or by farmers themselves who were supported by wealthier, independent 
landowners.  Most cooperatives consisted of migrant settlers who managed an initial labor force 
of poor and title-less indigenous peoples for forest clearing.  Under Production, Technical and 
Marketing Agreements (PTMAs) with AGPI, cooperatives were also compelled, under contract, 
to ask members and non-members to include their land for production (and collateral for the 
financier, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). As part of the loan agreements, AGPI 
provided capital and technical expertise to facilitate production (Larson et al. 2014).  
  
In the process of AGPI facilitating palm oil expansion, more and more out-grower 
schemes ‘took root’ inside and or around ancestral domain claims, including the Biluan CADT 
and the Maracuan area. In these instances, shadowy agents and brokers created ‘instant’ 
cooperatives (aka Associations) to facilitate uneven PTMA agreements with tribal leaders 
without conducting FPIC (ibid.). As a result, indigenous farmers invariably relinquished their 
usufruct land holdings by signing off on swidden lands for palm oil production under pressure 
from more powerful brokers (typically their own Chiefs and politicians), effectively becoming 
landless and forced to look for new and increasingly scarce forest to clear for swidden.  At last 
count, there were 150 ha of palm oil in CADT areas (Larson et al., 2014)— the same areas slated 
for REDD+ and Phil-WAVES.   
 
Spatial Conjunctures – speculative conservation in ruptured lands 
REDD+  
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Those NGOs spearheading REDD+ were soon faced with the harsh realities of former 
indigenous allies and farmers distancing themselves from the initiative in favour of the 
seemingly more lucrative benefits from mining and oil palm plantations unfolding nearby.  In the 
case of REDD+ in Biluan, the indigenous leadership charged with managing the CADT and the 
specific farmers allied with them adopted a strong pro-mining and pro-oil palm stance.  They 
highlighted the economic potential of the mining and oil palm as a means to support indigenous 
livelihoods. In introducing the idea of REDD+ to the Biluan community as part of their broader 
consultations, a staff member of the indigenous NGO, NATRIPAL (the indigenous federation of 
Palawan), stated:  
 
“We tried to involve them, our target was 12 areas, so we tried to do the 
consultations with the leaders […] in the Quezon area… but they felt threatened 
by REDD+ because they had already started with the mining activities.  At first 
they endorsed the project, but later on they wanted to withdraw the endorsement 
deal.  
  
However, an interview with the former Chief of Biluan who was initially approached by 
NATRIPAL, suggested that the initial consultation process might have unfolded rather differently:   
 
“So, they told us about this program and asked us to fill out an application for REDD+ 
as a CADT representative, CADT holder. We were waiting but they didn’t call us again. 
But the problem emerged when other NGO groups entered the area and never called on 
us again. They provided for the other people; they organized the other group, without 
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our knowledge. So when they finalized the orientation, many of our indigenous leaders 
didn’t have enough information about it [REDD+]. That’s why our group refused 
REDD+. 
 
NATRIPAL helped organized Tagbanua groups in every sitio for orientation; but they 
failed to contact the official indigenous leaders in the community.  
 
In fact, one of the NGO leaders said: “no need to go to the Barangay leaders, no need 
to have Indigenous leaders, what we’re doing is for ‘the good’, after we have an 
official, they will be the ones who can manage it and they will be the representatives of 
the Carbon Trading or REDD+. 
 
And for those Tagbanua who were part of the orientation, well they didn't understand 
and got misinformation about REDD+ promises.”   
 
According to the former Biluan Chief, even amongst those few who did understand what 
REDD+ was about, there was much more interest in planting oil palm, despite the NGO 
campaigns against the crop. Indeed, the Chief and his Tribal Council thought that much of the 
short fallow swidden in their domain claim could be put to better use if planted to oil palm.  A 
few years later, he and his comrades took it upon themselves to establish their own Palm Oil 
Growers’ Association (technically a Cooperative) so as to enter into a contractual lease with 
Agumil and the LBP. Today, at least 60 hectares of the CADT are filled with palm oil, despite 
initially being meant to host REDD+.   
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   As elsewhere, however, local farmers’ expectations of REDD+ relative to oil palm 
development and mining exhibited ambiguity, in that neither speculative conservation nor 
extractive labour were seen to be an adequate means for improving their quality of life (e.g., 
sending kids to high school, having continuous supplies or rice, paying medical expenses etc). 
This ambiguity manifested in farmer reticence toward maintaining tree cover to conserve carbon 
for the REDD+ scheme but also in skepticism concerning the uncertain financial outcomes of 
extractivism, despite initially being sold on immediate promises of oil palm wealth and 
prosperity by their leaders (who serve as company brokers).  In the Biluan case, interviews with 
farmers clarified this situation, with one saying:  
 
‘I came back here for palm oil again … because they [the leadership and AGUMIL] gives 
us a salary. They are supposed to pay us every 15 days, but it takes 1.5 months before we 
get our salary. They still owe us one month worth of salary.’ (Biluan, September 2015). 
 
Another farmer noted that people remained in the area to work on the palm oil plantation inside 
of the CADT, exclaiming: 
 
‘We work as daily wage labourers here for the salary…. and we no longer get products 
from the forest. This is because we work in the palm oil everyday. So life has really 
changed…’ (Biluan, September 2015).  
 
These and many other farmers from the CADT point clearly to the range of ambiguous 
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outcomes from oil palm (such as delayed payments) and the difficulty in returning to forest-
based livelihoods because of landscape rupture.  Indeed, many farmers who have been involved 
in both mining and oil palm development suggest that relying on older livelihood practices is 
increasingly difficult because of the cumulative impact of mining and oil palm. As one farmer 
related: 
 
Oil palm has not helped us, because we did not even know that our land was leased to 
palm oil.  We just found that out when it was already bulldozed; and even those coconut 
trees that we had before in the area were already destroyed without us knowing. From 




They held meetings here about the oil palm project that will improve the livelihood of our 
community. So some had their kasoy (cashew) trees felled to plant oil palm …the others 
also cleared coconut farms. This was the negative thing that occurred.  Before clearing 
their land, they could harvest kasoy and copra meat every three months. They are not 
able to harvest anything now, no more coconuts, everything was replaced by oil palm. 
Now what? The farmers are given no shares, they get a meager P10,000 (USD $200.00) 
per year (Biluan, January 2015).   
 
         Finally, the wife of a farmer who had both worked in the mine and the oil palm plantation 
noted that neither job was sufficient and that returning to fishing activities was problematic 
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because the mine’s laterite had already poisoned the fish and clams in nearby waters: 
 
The mining activities have affected our seas. I have seen many children who frequently 
visit the doctor because of stomachaches. They got diarrhea from the seafood. When you 
eat it, you’ll get a stomachache. We think it is because of the presence of mines here now. 
If you picked shellfish at the innermost area, you can get a really bad stomachache. The 
area is covered with soil [laterite] from the mines. 
  
Last month, my son got sick due to stomachache for a month. It’s a good thing that we 
are covered with Philhealth. 
 
She went on to say: 
 
My husband simply wants to fish; the salary in the mine or the oil palm wasn't enough. 
But now our kaingin (swidden) yields are declining. The harvests from kaingin are not as 
good as before, the palay are also smaller than before. And the seafood is no longer safe 
because of the ship and barge activities at the port of the nickel mine. With the backhoe’s 
activities, toxic laterite soil also spills into the sea. Then the fishermen catch the fish that 
eat the contaminated soils. So if the fish are contaminated too, and people will eat them, 
all of the people here will get sick.  I’ve seen the BMC ambulance going to Quezon; it 




… rupture - Biluan Nickel Mine 
 
 
            
                        (Source: Jonah Van Beijnen) 
 
             As the upland landscapes of Tagbanua and Pala’wan farmers are ruptured by 
extractivism, the various carbon-related ecosystem services that the REDD+ programme sought 
to conserve have already been, or are about to be, destroyed. Only the idea of natural capital and 





Various state actors at the provincial and national level, including Palawan Council for 
Sustainable Development, the Department of Environmental and Natural Resources and the 
Forest Management Bureau, soon worked with NGOs to implement Phil-WAVES and produce a 
‘Pilot Ecosystem Accounting (system) for Southern Palawan’ (WAVES draft report, 2015). As 
noted, the assessment involved an accounting of the ‘stocks’ and monetary value of ecosystem 
services.  A core initiative was to take stock of carbon storage, timber production, water for 
drinking and non-timber forest products in the remaining closed and open forests in the southern 
reaches of the island, including Maracuan, and to design new land use plans to counter 
degradation there.  
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With the first phase of ecosystem accounting completed for carbon sequestered in the 
Maracuan Watershed, estimates indicated that in 2014 closed and open forest supposedly 
amounted to 492 and 70, 715 million tons of carbon sequestered in that year, respectively. The 
estimated financial value for the specified amount of carbon for each forest type in 2014 was 
0.23 and 32.67 million pesos, respectively. This amounted to an average of just over 4000 pesos 
(USD $80.00) per ha of closed and open forest in the uplands of the Maracuan interior. Yet how 
would farmers ever realize these benefits? Where would the financing come from, how quickly 
would it be produced, and to whom would it go?  Did the policy rhetoric match local realities?  
 
From Phil-WAVES policy presentations and documents, it becomes clear that the main 
threats to the reputed monetary value of this ‘natural capital’ were identified as the ‘conversion 
of forests to agricultural land uses and expansion’ in the uplands (read: swidden) and various 
other significant factors mentioned in the study’s ‘Ecosystem Condition Account’.3 Terrestrial 
ecosystem conditions supposedly reflected a high risk of landslide and flooding due to forest 
clearance from swidden negatively impacting upon the hydrological regime of the watershed 
(Phil WAVES, 2015, p. 29). In response, key policy applications that emerged from the Pilot 
study involved ‘support for selection of plantations, support for water management and… to 
identify opportunities for ecotourism.’  Ostensibly, the incentives produced from these 
interventions would eventually give smallholders in the uplands sufficient reason to clear less 
forest and plant more trees (WAVES, 2014 4_Philippines).  
 
																																																								
3 PPT Slides, Ecosystem Accounts in Southern Palawan, the Phil-WAVES implementation plan for Southern 
Palawan. February 14, 2014.  
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Just like in Biluan, however, the Phil-WAVES initiative in Maracuan was unfolding 
against a backdrop of Pala’wan farmers negotiating the rupture of livelihoods and ancestral 
landscapes from oil palm and mining.   The community of Maracuan, situated in the ‘Maracuan 
Watershed’ subject to WAVES, was simultaneously being transformed by oil palm from the 
private company, Agumil and the Palawan Palm and Vegetable Oil Mills (PPVOMI), and the 
transnational mining company, Maracuan-Nickel.  Both the plantation and mine have enclosed 
their swidden plots and ancestral lands.  
 
Oil palm, mining and (a declining) speculative potential  
 
The expansion of oil palm plantations reflects a vital conjuncture in Maracuan’s 
contemporary agrarian political economy. In less than a decade, this expansion has created 
challenging political, economic and biophysical conditions for farmers that have contributed to 
major difficulties in accessing fallow lands for swidden, declining upland rice yields, and greater 
degrees of dependency on (and indebtedness from) foodstuffs provided by cooperatives 
(Montefrio and Dressler, forthcoming). In addition to the mine’s impacts, these conditions have 
significantly constrained Pala’wan livelihoods and ended any possibilities for rural smallholders 
to even consider engaging Phil-WAVES and other speculative conservation initiatives.    
 
Agumil and the PPVOMI established the oil palm plantation in Maracuan in 2007, with 
the plantation reaching about 1000 ha in total. The plantation consists of an anchor site (750 ha) 
and outgrower (250 ha) area held by Agumil and a local Cooperative, respectively.  Between 
2001-2006, the COOP’s Board of Directors (BOD) reorganized for oil palm after being enticed 
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by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer 
(MARO).  After a series of meetings with oil palm representatives convinced the BOD of the 
potential benefits of oil palm, they enthusiastically went house-to-house to bring other 
landowners into the project. Starting with only 25 members at the outset, the coop quickly 
expanded to over 100 members. The first fresh fruit bundles were harvested in 2010.   
 
 Pala’wan farmers whose land had already been incorporated and labored on the 
plantation had the most to lose from increasingly restricted access to land and subsistence, less 
and irregular income, and greater indebtedness from the foodstuffs loaned out by the oil palm co-
op (Montefrio and Dressler, forthcoming). In most cases, it was migrants who were leasing land 
to the oil palm concession who had originally or recently claimed or purchased lands from 
Pala’wan uplanders for rice and/or copra and then oil palm production. Migrant farmers often 
purchased land outright, often for very little money, from Pala’wan who commonly sold land to 
overcome the costs incurred from sickness and or death in the family. With Municipal officers 
serving as witnesses to these land claims, plots were parceled out and zoned, then incorporated 
into the plantation.  
 
The entry and expansion of plantations had thus exacerbated problems that began when 
migrants entered lands formerly occupied by Pala’wan.  In the months leading up to the 
plantation development, a land rush ensued with migrants claiming or purchasing tens of 
hectares of land specifically to secure greater rent from oil palm development.  Migrant 
landowners originally saw the entry of AGPI as an opportunity to earn from lands that they 
claimed. Moreover, after the initial sections of the plantation were established, more and more 
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land had been claimed from Pala’wan ancestral territory for the plantation without consultation. 
While official government discourse suggests that ‘idle’ swidden lands are put to better use as oil 
palm (Montefrio and Dressler, 2016), the reality is that indigenous farmers typically use swidden 
fallows for NTFP collection and other types of cultivation (Dressler et al., 2016).   
 
With the mine flanking the same lands swallowed up by oil palm, farmers soon spoke of 
the devastating impacts of both forms of rupture unfolding in their ancestral landscapes. When 
asked about whether access to and use of upland forest resources, including swidden, had been 
impacted by oil palm and mining, one farmer noted:   
 
Kaingin (swidden) today is not enough because we harvest much less than before. And 
the others don’t have any loans to give us.  So it is not like before because most of our 
swidden lands are now planted with palm oil; there used to be bamboo (buho) in our 
fallows that we valued.  We earned money from bamboo harvesting and processing; we 
would just make walling from it (sawali) and would sell it for extra money. We also 
used to get resin (saheng) from the forest, which we would burn for lighting. But now 
there is very little forest here. Nothing is left (Maracuan, May 2016) 
 
She stated further:  
 
It’s hard today. Before you could plant your land, but today most lands are already 
planted with palm oil.  You cannot plant your crops there anymore.  Land is very limited 
now, many of us just suffer from working for Agumil because we don’t have the land for 
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kaingin farms anymore.  
 
Closer to the coast, another farmer who fished, stated: 
 
We are also affected with the palm oil because when they spray insecticides, our water 
source also gets affected especially during the rainy season. The insecticides will be 
carried along to the shore where we fish. We eat these fish! (Maracuan, May 2016). 
 
Those same farmers negatively impacted by the oil palm complained bitterly about the 
concurrent impact of the nickel company’s mine site: 
 
I think we would part ways. And we would look for a place where we can start a new life. 
Although one could say that the mining might eventually stop operating someday, its 
damage is already in the soil. For example, before we never used any fertilizers, but 
years later after the mine came, we had to use one sack of it per two hectares. Now, if you 
don’t have 9-10 sacks of fertilizers, you can’t harvest ninety (90) to one hundred (100) 
sacks of rice. It’s the impact of laterite from the mine (Maracuan, May 2016).  
 
… rupture – The Maracuan Nickel Mine 
 
 
     (Source: Jonah Van Beijnen) 
              As the upland landscapes of Pala’wan farmers are being dismantled by extractivism, 
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directly or indirectly with flow on impacts, the various ecosystem services that Phil-WAVES 
seeks to conserve are being undone and, in certain instances, are already being destroyed. The 
potential to conserve the ecosystems services of these lands by offering Pala’wan farmers 
various types of incentives is rather grossly disconnected from the reality of their livelihoods 
currently undergoing profound changes. In many cases, long-standing mixed livelihood pursuits 
are being dismantled as access to and use of forests is increasingly difficult due to landscapes 
being subsumed and reordered by expanding plantations and mining activities.  Extensive tracts 
of forest fallows have been clear-cut, pesticides have contaminated soils, and laterite has leached 
into and contaminated the waterways Pala’wan families depend upon for survival. How exactly, 
then, can Pala’wan farmers adjust their livelihoods to conserve forests to maintain stocks of 
carbon and hydrological functions in such ruptured landscapes?  What, if any, incentives would 
compel farmers to maintain forest cover, when they themselves are not complicit in this rupture? 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
As we have shown, the prospect of state and non-state actors governing as they once 
did—by offering livelihood support that tried to align with local needs and concerns in forest 
mosaics (Dressler et al 2010)— is now being subsumed by speculative conservation that 
increasingly touches down in landscapes undergoing dramatic transformations.  The art of 
governing speculatively now invariably intersects with the troubling conjunctures of deepening 
commodity production and extractivism that ruptures frontier landscapes—on Palawan and 
throughout frontier Southeast Asia. In these landscapes, marginal uplanders who are subject to 
such governance are told to modify typically resilient livelihoods to conserve ‘natural capital’ in 
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disappearing landscapes that once supported long-standing resource uses and social practices 
(see Dressler et al., 2016).  
 
In changing frontier settings, bilaterals and NGOs struggle to work with upland farmers 
who must negotiate the contrasting expectations of the intangible nature of speculative 
conservation and the draw of extractivism as processes of rupture remake landscapes that ensure 
their survival. In this sense, then, the future-oriented character of conserving ‘natural capital’—
where governance techniques aim to conserve nature by assigning abstract, imputed dollar values 
(whose source is unknown) to an ecosystem ‘service’ (Sullivan, 2013)—can only be interpreted 
as being dramatically misaligned with the major social and material changes that emerge from 
rupture.  
 
At the nexus of extractivism and conservation initiatives, the social and material 
substance of farmer livelihoods are undone and redone as upland landscapes transform over time 
and space.  Governance interventions, extractivism and local livelihood realities are now situated 
at a critical conjuncture, where pre-existing labour relations and land uses become restructured 
by the generative and destructive capacities of capital (Harvey, 2006).  Older ways of living and 
labouring have become devalued as the influx of capital finance and investment reworks 
landscapes so as to make way for newer, more destructive pathways of capital accumulation. It is 
unsurprising, then, that speculative conservation interventions have little traction amongst 
smallholders who must negotiate livelihoods with fewer, lesser quality options available to them.   
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Although the process of rupture is not a linear, manifest destiny, the idea that 
marginalized resource poor farmers garner agency to find new openings and opportunities to 
thrive with secure livelihoods in over-exploited landscapes is rather untenable.  The legitimacy 
of speculative conservation in such landscapes must therefore be called into question. Most 
speculative, market-based schemes unfold with limited certainty and local tractability in terms of 
how the concepts and ideas translate locally, particularly in terms of how projects try to enroll 
local users and inculcate eco-rational behaviour (see Dressler, 2014).  In many respects, the 
legitimacy of intangible market-based interventions rests on the extent to which success can be 
constructed, leveraged and sold to audiences and participants, wherein solutions, ideas and 
projects are rendered valuable and beneficial in order to achieve and sustain buy-in (Büscher, 
2014). The durability of such misaligned policy models stems from the necessity of state and 
non-state actors to reinvest in and circulate the truth claims and value potential of the underlying 
beliefs concerning core initiatives (Lewis and Mosse, 2006; Fletcher and Büscher, 2017).  The 
question therefore remains how practitioners of speculative conservation can ever assume local 
‘buy-in’ when livelihoods and landscapes are undergoing such profound transformations.  
Indeed, if rupture reflects the afterlife of deepening commodity relations and fractured 
landscapes (see Gordillo, 2014), where long-standing livelihoods and views of forests are 
remade, how can bilaterals, state agencies and NGOs advocate for speculative conservation in 
the debris of ruptured landscapes? What motivates the proponents of speculative conservation to 
believe that poor farmers will understand and be interested in conserving ‘natural capital’ in the 
midst of livelihoods and landscapes being remade – often to the point of being unrecognizable?  
 
Answers to these questions rest in how varied forms of finance continuously penetrate the 
“everyday life, and above all into the reproduction of extra-human life” (Moore, 2010, p. 390)—
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particularly in terms of extractivism and market-based initiatives intersecting with the lives and 
livelihoods of uplanders.  In the case of speculative conservation, we see how the (often 
rhetorical) transformation of nature into ‘natural capital’ facilitates the parceling of social and 
ecological processes in practice so as to assess potential future net-worth (Sullivan, 2013, p. 
199).  
 
As shown, the rise of speculative conservation in times and spaces of rupture is less about 
material substance and local realities than the ability of social actors to maneuver networks to 
leverage the promise of natural capital accounting by asserting the reputed effectiveness of such 
schemes. Over time, the success of natural capital programs thus becomes self-referential, self-
evident and unquestionable, such that narratives of ‘policy success’ themselves come to underpin 
the value of the very ‘natural capital’ they are supposed to merely reflect. The discursive 
construction of natural capital value is therefore less dependent on its imagined material reality –
ostensive stocks and flows– than on the socio-spatial reorganization of capital and labour at 
moments of over-accumulation, degradation and crisis in frontier environments.  Coupled with 
moments of rupture, speculative conservation works through socio-political networks that 
promote technologies, and ideas to help capital to expand and deepen in ways that creates 
markets for value production in new conservation territories. 
 
In this way, speculative conservation could well serve as frontier capitalism’s newest 
spatial fix in its potential to overcome, through discursive productions of value, the creative 
destruction of labour and land during and after extractivist rupture. At this nexus, speculative 
conservation seeks to revalue the land, labour and capital eroded due to extractivism by 
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monetizing the use value of each through the finance, technologies and ideas that underpin 
natural capital accounting.  Despite there being few prospects to actually conserve ‘natural 
capital’ in ruptured landscapes, as our case study demonstrates, speculative conservation’s 
overall governmental process of enabling reinvestment in labour and capital (in local areas and 
urban centers from where these programs emanate) helps to produce ideas, values and hence 
profits out of ruined landscapes. Value is thus generated from rupture itself—though often well 
beyond the confines of ruptured areas. Rather than being spatially fixed, speculative conservation 
effectively feeds on rupture unbound, overcoming the spatial thresholds of capital exhaustion by 
becoming a new “accumulation frontier for finance capital [that involves] the wholesale re-
conceptualisation of conserved nature in monetary and tradable terms” (Sullivan, 2013, p 200).    
 
In this sense, the financialisation of nature for conservation offers a spatial fix that 
functions as a safety value that not only redirects or deflects ‘negative externalities’ from 
extractivism, but, in so doing, also legitimizes the spatial reorganization and intensification of 
capital and capture of surplus elsewhere within and beyond the uplands.  The rise of speculative 
conservation in moments of rupture may therefore not necessarily be coincidence; rather, it may 
be of historical and contemporary consequence in its quest to overcome creative destruction 
across degraded landscapes.  However, those with the most to lose from these dynamics are the 
marginal indigenous farmers situated at the nexus of such conjunctures. With the loss of control 
over land, labour and livelihood, these farmers have but few options other than resignation or 
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